Originally published in St. James's Magazine (W. Kent) vol.3 #10 (Jan 1862).
In the event of war (which, however deeply we may deplore, we must be prepared for) between the remaining United States of America and this country—whether that war occur immediately from the outrage on the British Flag, or whether it grow out of another among the thousand injuries or insults a nation, under mob sovereignty, can at any moment resort to against another situated as we are, with interests equally sensitive in every quarter of the earth—the question which presses on our statesmen most immediately is, of course, the Defence of our North American possessions.
The general principle of military relationship which Great Britain has for some years been endeavouring to establish between herself and her Colonies, is that she should protect them against foreign aggression brought on for the sake of the whole empire, and that she should leave them to protect themselves against internal disturbance, or minor commotions of a local nature, with barbarous nations surrounding them. This is the general principle; though it is continually departed from—as at present in New Zealand—for the benefit of colonists, and to the misfortune of English taxpayers. A contest with the United States, occurring as a sort of safety-valve for American indignation, will, in almost any case, be one in which we shall war essentially for Imperial interests; and it will therefore become our duty to extend the utmost protection we can to all the North American Colonies, only calling on them to contribute a force in aid, fairly representing the quota due from such a proportion of the British Empire as their area may constitute.
Of all these Colonies, the one most needing our protection is necessarily Canada, from the great length of frontier on which it is contiguous to the Northern States, and also from its remoteness in sudden emergency from the assistance of the British fleet. Were we to try to force Canada entirely to defend her frontier, while we contented ourselves with operating on the seaboard of the United States, the Colony would naturally complain of being saddled with a large expenditure in men and money—large, out of all proportion to the fraction of the empire which she forms—for the sake of asserting, not a local, but an imperial right. Discontented at such unfair treatment, the Provinces would probably decline to be so compromised for British purposes, and would conclude a truce of their own. Although amply loyal to Queen Victoria, and especially opposed to the idea of absorption into the American Republic, there can be little doubt that in such a case the North American Provinces, withdrawing from us, would found a new Anglo-Saxon Federation; and as, in these days, if the Colonists showed anything like unanimity in their desire to separate, it cannot be supposed that we should attempt to hinder them—such a war might then lead to a permanent division of our empire. This division no Englishman desires; for although what benefit accrues in an union between us and a colony is principally on the side of the latter, we are still unwilling that the great dominion where the Flag of Britain flies supreme should be diminished by a single acre. Like the parent whose son sets up a household for himself, we might welcome and wish happiness to the new unit in society, or in the comity of nations—as the case might be—but we should miss him from the old circle, and feel the blank his absence causes. If, then, we would retain our American Colonies, we must be prepared to defend them to the death against all foreign enemies, and especially against their immediate neighbours.
Let us now assume, as a duty we owe ourselves—but which we pray may cease to be so—for the sake of humanity—assume a war to have broken out, and let us contemplate what would be its first effect in regard to the North American Provinces. We may suppose one of our earliest acts to have been the recognition of the Southern Confederacy, and the forcible abolition of that ghost of a blockade which the United States have sought to maintain over its ports for some months past. Cotton will at once pass out of the Secession States, and money flowing in, in a corresponding degree, simultaneously with the crippling of the Northern commerce by the rigid blockade which our naval superiority will enable us to institute, the mutually offensive military power of the rival Republics will rise in the South as it falls in the North. Such being the case, and the South still remaining, as its interests dictate, on the defensive, President Lincoln's Government will perceive the hopeless character of the struggle they are waging, and will compromise differences by acknowledging the independence of the Slave-holding Confederacy. Thus will the States be freed from apprehension, to a great extent at least, as regards their Southern frontier. The United States Army is a Volunteer force, and doubtless a considerable portion of the troops would immediately return to their homes, rather than participate in further campaigning; but the ordinary resorts of labour will have been deranged by late intestine commotion, while present commercial enterprise will be dwarfed under the British blockade. Thousands of half-trained demi-soldiers will then be eager for an advance to the Lake frontier, with a chance of glory or plunder in an attack on the Canadian Britishers.
It may be said that the best assistance we can give to Canada is by an attack on the Atlantic coast—on New York, on Boston, Portland, Philadelphia, or some other of the tempting cities alongside which the Warrior and her iron sisters might readily be laid. But these measures, disastrous and permanently irritating as they might be to the States, would in no degree prevent the advance of a large army, thirsting perhaps for vengeance, towards the ridiculous boundary-line which, regardless of all natural objects and landmarks, separates by a degree of latitude Lower Canada from the States of New York and Vermont. This invading force would be only partially disciplined, it is true, but yet formidable, from its numbers, and from the courage and savoir-faire of its individual constituents. That the mere map-frontier of Lower Canada is indefensible need hardly be said: every stream, lake, and gorge is in a north-and-south direction, and completely in an invader's favour. The districts near the border must, therefore, be abandoned in the event of a hostile advance in force, and a strategic position will have to be taken between it and the great river St. Lawrence, if it should happen that our generals have a corps d'armée sufficient to justify them in challenging a battle in the open field. otherwise, the probable object we should have would be in preventing the enemy from passing that channel. More to the east, the State of Maine abuts on British territory for some five hundred miles, and it would, without doubt, afford a good opening for an attack upon New Brunswick; but, on the one hand, the men of Maine are supposed to set a great value on the trade Portland derives from being, as at present, the Atlantic terminus of Canadian railways, and to be, therefore, unwilling to embroil themselves with Britain more than they can help; while, on the other hand, instant vengeance could be taken on its coast towns by our fleet, to say nothing of diversions that might be made from the sea-line. On these grounds we may reasonably conclude the frontier adjoining Maine tolerably safe from any attacks more formidable than those of border warfare, which the British borderers would themselves repel, and, perhaps, reciprocate.
In some degree, a similar view may be taken of Michigan and the Western States, which are far from heartily of accord with Washington and the New England war party; so that Port Sarnia and Canada West would have little to fear, in a military sense, from Detroit and its neighbours on the Federal side of the strait between Lakes Huron and Erie. The theatre, then, of direct military invasion would be narrowed to the Niagara river, to the St. Lawrence from Kingston nearly to Montreal, and to the before-mentioned boundary-line along the forty-fifth parallel from the St. Lawrence to a point about 100 miles due south of Quebec. On all these lines of attack the Americans have extraordinary facilities for concentrating large bodies of troops in a very short time, through their numerous railroads, which, converging towards the Lake coasts from all parts of the Union, have lines sometimes close to, but always near, the shore, from end almost to end of the boundary. This facility of assault is applicable more especially to the two first of the districts I have indicated; and, fortunately, it is there that we too, through railway help, are best in a position for defensive purposes to throw all our men available for field-service in a few hours on any point attacked. The Grand Trunk and Great Western Railways of Canada would allow of the Niagara frontier being held by the regulars from Toronto, or even Kingston, until the Militia and Volunteers of West Canada could flock in to the rescue. The line, again, of the St. Lawrence, setting aside the river's width and probable naval obstacles, is so well secured by the Grand Trunk, which keeps almost to its bank, that the great garrisons of Kingston and Quebec would be available in any emergency, and are within a few hours of the scene of action.
The same, however, can in no way be said for the last of the frontier lines to which I have alluded. It is open to attack on every point, strategically indefensible, and incapable of deriving assistance from the naval power. The effects of this transfluvian province having to be evacuated, and especially if our troops should be compelled to limit their operations to the north bank of the St. Lawrence, would be peculiarly disastrous to colonial railway property; since a large portion of the Grand Trunk Railway—the only communication between Montreal and Quebec—would be exposed to the destruction that would certainly be vented on a work of such value to ourselves. It is unfortunate in the extreme that the point which it is of most importance to defend is least capable of being defended, except by the manœuvres of a stronger field-force than we seem likely to possess by the time the campaign opens.
Assuming war and 1862 to be of equal age, what would be the position of the belligerents as regards the American continent? Every man of the United States force is on the Potomac, or on the long line dividing Federation from Confederacy; and, since winter compels them to suspend operations even in warm Virginia, it is quite certain that no Northern attack on ice-bound Canada can be made before the summer, or at least until late in the spring. We have, therefore, some four months for preparation against the coming storm.
The force of British regulars in North America in the autumn of 1861 has been about 4,700 Infantry, with 700 Artillery, in Canada; and 1,600 Infantry, with 300 Artillery and Engineers, in Nova Scotia. Added to the total of these are, ere now, the Battery of Field Artillery of some 230 men sent out in the Melbourne, and two regiments of Infantry, per steamers Persia and Australasia. If the St. Lawrence be frozen, these latter, together with the large reinforcements of Cavalry, Guards, Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, and Military Train, which are either on their way out, or under orders to embark, will have to land in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, and thence make their journey as best they can to Quebec and Montreal. The duty of crossing a country, in many parts a wilderness, at a time when the snow is frozen deeply on the ground, when the rivers are rough troughs of ice-lumps shaken, together, as it were, in struggling confusion, and so fixed, when the thermometer frequently registers 62° of frost, is no light one. Winter marches at all times try troops severely, and we must be prepared to hear of many of our brave fellows being frost-bitten. The route generally taken is from St. John, New Brunswick to Fredericton, and by sledges up the frozen river St. John to Great Falls; thence by "carrioles,"—a sort of high, rough gigs—past Madawaska and Lake Temisquata to the St. Lawrence. Up the rough ice of that great stream voyagers had formerly to pursue their bitter way by carrioles or sledges; but now the railway extends to the mouth of the Rivière du Loup 120 miles below Quebec, so that at this point the perils of the journey are over. It remains to be seen how far our experience in the Crimea will have taught us the art of moving an army under obstacles of weather; but enormous exertions will certainly be requisite to convey the great stores of ammunition, arms, and heavy guns which have been sent, across the ice-bound province for a distance of more than 250 miles. The 43rd Foot, in December 1837, succeeded in making its way from Fredericton to Quebec in eighteen days, without any assistance from railways, and without the loss of a man. That corps had, however, no impedimenta more embarrassing than its own provisions, whereas the regiments now to attempt the journey are to be accompanied by munitions of every description. On the occasion adverted to, the 43rd experienced very severe weather, the men at times almost perishing in fearful drifting snow-storms; they proceeded in parties, each of one company, for which night accommodation was found in log-huts existing for the reception of wayfarers at stages averaging fifteen miles apart.
Although the principal defence of these Colonies devolves upon this occasion on Great Britain, we have a right to expect such assistance from the Local forces as their strength will permit. By the law, every adult Canadian under sixty is a Militiaman, and under this rule there are, throughout the provinces, 328,000 men enrolled. When we remember the gallant deeds of the Canadian Militia in the last war, and the laurels they achieved under Brock, we look fondly on this goodly show of National Guards. Alas! however, the host is purely a paper one; but 10,000 of all this army are known to have been recently trained as effective soldiers. Now, indeed, we are sending arms, instructors, and commanders; so that, the prime stuff being still identical with that of the heroes of the former days, we may fairly hope, ere the winter expires, to have a considerable force of Militia embodied, and at least as effective individually as the Volunteer army to which they will be opposed. This much may safely be said, that the Canadians will lack neither courage, physique, nor patriotic antipathy to the enemy.
Again, our Naval resources are to be relied on for a large amount of direct aid in the defence of Canada. By the St. Lawrence and the Welland Canal, the whole line of water frontier from Lake Huron to the Atlantic is available for our cruisers. Under the energetic Government of Lord Palmerston, there cannot be a doubt that the very day these waters are open our Navy will be amply represented by gunboats, despatch-vessels, and steam-sloops, which, patrolling the lakes and rivers, will prevent any hostile expedition from the States, while the latter's Lake ports are blockaded, and (if so disagreeable a necessity should arise) their towns bombarded. The same highway of water will, of course, when open, give us unbounded facilities for throwing in troops, according to any exigency of the struggle.
The critical question is, then, whether we shall be enabled to have upon the theatre of war—and especially in the districts of Montreal, Three Rivers, and St. Francis, which are most exposed—a force sufficient to cope with invasion, as soon as the Americans on their part shall be in strength to invade. Of the ultimate result of the war to us we cannot in any case doubt: and if Sir Fenwick Williams succeeds in collecting 10,000 Regulars, with some 20,000 good Militia in the field, before the campaign commences, while Kingston, Quebec, and Halifax are adequately garrisoned, we need not apprehend disaster even in the iniatory operations.
Concurrently with the defence of Canada, the other provinces must be provided for. Halifax—probably the finest harbour in the world—with its arsenal and dockyard, must be protected at any cost, as a rendezvous of the utmost naval value, acting on the North as a check on the American privateers, in the same way that Bermuda does to the South of their seaboard. Passing to the Western extremity of our long line of frontier, British Columbia and Vancouver are exposed to attack from California—a misfortune which must be averted by the presence of a sufficient British squadron. If, on the other hand, we blockade San Francisco—as we certainly shall—it seems likely that that State may secede from a federation, connection with which confers no gain, and only involves it in trouble. With its prosperity and energy, California, as an independent commonwealth, would soon be the most powerful nation on the Eastern side of the Pacific. Utah, always uneasy in its chains, may now be considered virtually independent; and, in a division, the American territories of Oregon and Washington, intervening between California and British Columbia, would almost certainly fall to the former. After these chippings, with a seceded South, where would the great American Union be? There might remain a third-rate power, unless, indeed, as seems very possible, it split to its very heart into separate and mutually jealous Governments: Michigan unsympathising with Maine—neither with New York nor Pennsylvania. Under such circumstances the war must end—ingloriously enough—from the fact that there would be no enemy left to fight.
If our Temple of Janus again opens wide its doors, the bolts are not withdrawn by us: we deeply bewail the necessity for taking arms; we feel that, however victorious we may be, we must yet undergo much suffering—much to ourselves, and still more to our North American colonies; and we cannot but regret having to inflict pain—even though in just punishment—on cousins of our own blood, speaking our own Anglo-Saxon tongue—bearing our own cherished names—who have been, and who should be, our firmest allies. If the war result in the effacement of our enemy as a corporate nation from the map of the world, it is most unwillingly that we are forced to be the instruments of such a destruction. But for no ties of kindred, for no sympathy of origin—not even from a heartfelt repugnance to war—can Britain ever refrain from vindicating her honour—honour which it is her proudest boast to keep unblemished in every land and on every sea!