Parliament and Army Reform

Originally published in Saint Pauls (Virtue and Co.) vol.2 #10 (Jul 1868).

The purchase system has obtained a renewal of its lease for one year from the hands of a moribund House of Commons. This is only what was to be expected. With a general election imminent, it was too much to hope that members would commit themselves to a course which must unquestionably for some time largely increase the army estimates; and at an early stage of the debate on Mr. Trevelyan's motion, the Liberals, who were disposed to vote in his favour, were chilled by a reminder that it would be an awkward plea to advance on the hustings, that they had assisted in adding a penny or two to the income tax, in order to abolish a system under which we have rubbed along well enough for a couple of hundred years. Even Mr. Otway, an honest and zealous reformer, advised Mr. Trevelyan not to press his resolution until more prosperous times,—in other words, until the first year of a new Parliament, instead of the last year of an old one. But the whole tone of the debate showed with unmistakeable clearness that, save in the minds of a few obstinate opponents of progress, the purchase system is virtually condemned, and that, if it were not for the expense necessarily attending its abolition, it would soon be numbered in the list of bygone abuses. It was admitted by Sir John Pakington that, "if we were now commencing to form and organise our army, no reasonable man would be likely to think of adopting the purchase system," and yet he immediately proceeded to argue in its favour. Captain Vivian, who moved a series of amendments to Mr. Trevelyan's motion, admitted that there were "grounds of complaint" against the system, and advocated the abolition of purchase above the rank of captain, but had no sooner risen to speak than he commenced to defend the system against Mr. Trevelyan's attack. The debate was full of similar inconsistencies. Men sought for excuses founded on expediency for a system which they are forced to admit is wrong in fact and theory; and having once resolved to oppose a change on the ground of expense, made a point of strengthening their case by other arguments. Those, however, who have watched narrowly the progress of the question marked this noteworthy difference between its state in the present and the past year. Twelve months ago, when the question was brought forward, it met with but small attention in the House of Commons, and the press was divided in opinion. This time Mr. Trevelyan's opponents in Parliament had furbished up their whole armoury of rusty weapons, and the same men who opposed the abolition of flogging stoutly defended the retention of purchase; while, on the other hand, with two notable exceptions, the press was unanimous in urging that the system must be done away with, though, as a matter of course, the details of the proposed scheme were not always favourably considered. Thus in a year we have sprung from sleepy security among the military Conservatives in the House, and doubt among the public, to vigorous and armed opposition amidst the former, and settled conviction of the necessity of a change amidst the latter. Need we doubt which will win in the long run?
        We have seen an even more obstinate opposition overcome in the matter of corporal punishment. Twelve months ago, when Mr. Otway was about to divide the House, the Secretary at War solemnly assured the wavering Adullamites that his Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding in Chief had informed him that the Adjutant-General declared that, if flogging were abolished, he could no longer be responsible for the discipline of the forces. This year we have seen a majority in Parliament wipe out flogging from the list of punishments, and yet we have not heard that either the Adjutant-General or the Commander-in-Chief has felt it his duty to resign his office. In spite of Horse Guards influence,—and it is no secret how strongly that influence has been brought to bear on the matter,—we do not fear to adopt the simile used by the O'Donoghue, in the first Irish debate of the session, in speaking of the Irish Church Establishment, and describe the purchase system as a criminal who has been convicted in a court of justice, and has been discharged on his own recognizances, to appear for punishment when called for.
        Nevertheless the advocates of army reform must in no way relax their efforts. There is a huge barrier of ignorance and prejudice to be broken down, and sturdy sinews and strong blows are needed for the task. And though the breach is yearly being widened, and fresh hands are coming up for the work, the defenders are in possession, and we know what advantage lies in that. Some stand in the gap, and fight like men; others try to make smoke that will obscure the vision, and hinder the attack. It was remarked by General Peel that a great deal is said on the subject of promotion by purchase by persons who understand very little about it; and the statement is well founded. But we should argue different conclusions from the same premises. We think it very unlikely that those who attack the system as it stands would do so without having paid attention to it beforehand, whereas nothing is more likely than that those who have never thought the matter out would object to change. Indeed, why should they do otherwise? The majority of those who wish things to remain as they are ground their preference on the desire to avoid trouble; while those officers who have purchased their steps shrink from any interference, lest it should damage Parliament and their chance of getting back all the money they have paid. Some few there are who base their Conservatism on conviction; it is these only whom the reforming party has to fear, and it is to the arguments of these that we would devote our attention.
        Even the strongest friends of the purchase system must acknowledge that a strong primâ facie case has been made out against it. It cannot be denied that in theory, at all events, it is bad to buy and sell places of honour; it is impossible to say that when two men have equal claims upon the country for promotion, it is right that the junior should go over the head of his senior, simply because he has more money; and the principle must be admitted to be vicious which encourages risking the capital of a whole family on the life of a single member. If these points alone can be established, a strong primâ facie case is, we submit, clearly made out for the abolition of the purchase system. Inasmuch as a conspicuous place in the Army List published by authority is given to a table of the prices of commissions,—as the fact of men purchasing over their brother-officers is notorious, instances occurring in the "Gazette" every week,—and further, as in the event of an officer's death from any other cause than wounds received on service, the money he has sunk in the purchase of steps is lost to his representatives,—these points would appear to be established beyond the possibility of question. But a new champion of the purchase system has arisen, who takes issue with its opponents at the very commencement of their case. In a pamphlet on "Army Reform" in connection with the purchase system and regimental organisation, Mr. O'Dowd denies that there is such a thing as purchase in the British army. "The conventional appellation by which the system is known is as damning as it is undeserved," says Mr. O'Dowd. "'Purchase' is no definition of the rule of promotion in Her Majesty's cavalry, guards, and line, which is that of seniority and professional qualification, tempered or affected largely by an arrangement of money deposits." He says that "this system, when examined, turns out to be one of strict seniority, in which, however, in the great majority of instances, the person eligible for promotion by seniority and professional fitness must also make a deposit of a fixed sum of money, which is religiously returned to him on the surrender of his position, or to his representatives in the event of his death through the casualties of war." These are the statements upon which Mr. O'Dowd proceeds to build up a theory; and it is important to bring to notice the fallacies which they contain, because Mr. O'Dowd has ready to his hand an influential organ in which to ventilate his views among all classes of military men, and because his pamphlet was largely quoted from in the debate in Parliament, while the phrase which he prints in capital letters, and proposes to substitute for the familiar expression "purchase system," bids fair to become the war-cry of a party,—namely, "a self-supporting system of retirement by means of deposits."
        In the first place, then, we utterly deny that the system, when examined, turns out to be one of strict seniority, no matter how the expression be qualified. It is an absolutely essential feature of a system of strict seniority that every man who enters shall be certain of obtaining his promotion before any of those below him, which is not the case here. The instant an officer fails to make the "deposit" of which Mr. O'Dowd speaks, his juniors pass over his head one after another, and seniority goes for nothing as far as he is concerned, while, on the other hand, the senior of those prepared with the "deposit" jumps over the heads of all above him not prepared with the money. It is therefore an entire misstatement to call this a system of strict seniority. Neither is it true to say that the deposit is religiously returned on the surrender of the position, for so soon as an officer arrives within two years of the time at which his promotion to the list of general officers will take place, he becomes unable to get back bis purchase money; and when once he is promoted to be a major-general, every farthing of his "deposits" is gone for ever past possibility of recall. He may resign his position, but he will never see back one shilling of his lost capital. So that, in fact, the "deposits" are only "religiously returned" when an officer decides on quitting the service at a comparatively early stage, and abandoning all hope of making it permanently a profession. Then, as to the return of the money to the representatives "in the event of death through the casualties of war," this expression is deliberately calculated to mislead; for it is only in the event of an officer's death by wounds received in action that his surviving relatives receive back the "deposits," and then only if by his death they have been "deprived of their means of support." Yet it is proverbial that deaths through wounds received in action form but a small portion of the casualties of war, as compared with the deaths from exposure and climate ;while, again, the casualties of war are themselves but a drop in the ocean of the casualties caused by disease and bad climate in peace. Another point which the pamphleteer totally ignores is, that the sum returned to the relatives in the event of death in battle is but a fraction of the "deposits" actually made; for only the regulation price of the deceased officer's commissions is returned, while the price actually paid for them varies from a hundred and fifty per cent. to fifty per cent. in excess of the regulation price.
        The fact that such loose assertions as these, devoid of foundation in fact, are taken as the groundwork for a superstructure under whose shelter the defenders of the purchase system gather in admiration, ought alone to be sufficient to show the weakness of the cause; but even this zealous advocate of the "deposit" system suggests that it might be improved. To begin with, he thinks purchase should stop after the rank of captain; for that the important post of field-officer, involving the efficiency, comfort, and happiness of hundreds, ought not to be so obtained, although purchase does very well up to the rank of captain. Of course this would be a step in the right direction, but it needs small power to see that it is only a question of degree. If it is desirable that the promotion to a lieutenant-colonelcy should not be obtainable by purchase, the reason must be that purchase is a bad method of appointment; and if it is bad in one case, it must be bad in all, though the evil effects may be less in degree. For hundreds read scores; and the captain's fitness for his post involves the efficiency, comfort, and happiness of his men to almost, if not quite, the same extent as the field-officer's. And here again another fallacy is introduced. Of course, says the pamphleteer, promotion from subaltern's to captain's rank must be always an affair of seniority; and "where there is seniority there must be purchase of some kind; and if there be purchase, it is better to have it policied by the State," and soon. We distinctly deny that purchase must accompany seniority. The Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, and the Royal Marines have no purchase of any kind whatever, direct or indirect, and they have promotion purely by seniority. The statement affords another example of those loose and erroneous assertions which pass current with people who will not examine for themselves, but which only need to be brought to the touchstone of fact, to be proved utterly worthless. It is, however, a very favourite argument among the lovers of purchase. They point to the Indian army, before its amalgamation with the Royal army, and say, "These men were obliged to introduce a sort of purchase system among themselves, in order to quicken promotion, and you will find the same thing done wherever there is pure seniority." Now we are no advocates of the Indian bonus system. It was a wretched failure as far as accelerating promotion went. There were plenty of subalterns with from fifteen to eighteen years' service in the Indian army when the mutiny broke out, and they had been paying heavily for steps throughout their service. But even this plan had not the gross faults of the purchase system. There was no putting the man who had money over the head of the man who had not; and the subscriptions to the fund were paid by all alike from a professional income which enabled them, in those days, before India became so expensive as it is now, to afford to lay by something towards a future retirement. The East India Company never made this fund an excuse for refusing to pension its officers after a fair term of service. If they chose to make up a purse among them to supplement the retiring pension given by the Company, well and good; but it was not considered necessary, as in the Royal army, that an officer, after thirty years' service, should forfeit either his claim to pension from the State, or his claim to the return. of the "deposits" he has made during his service. When an Indian officer retired on full pay, he received from his regimental retiring fund the sum to which he was entitled. When an officer under the purchase system retires upon full pay, he loses every shilling of his purchase money. It is confiscated by the State.
        The opponents of Mr. Trevelyan's motion for the abolition of purchase may be divided into two classes, the staunch bigots, who will have no change, who cling to the system under which, and in spite of which, England's army has done so well for two centuries; and the half-hearted negotiators who ask for a compromise, and are willing to see alterations made, but not to see the whole system destroyed. These last find their representatives in Mr. O'Dowd in the press, and Captain Vivian in the House of Commons, who have embarked in the same boat, and sail under the same colours. Their proposition is this, as it may be stated in a few words, to reduce the number of regimental commissioned ranks to three, viz: lieutenant-colonel, captain, and lieutenant, and to abolish purchase above the rank of captain. Thus there would be only two purchasable steps, the first commission and the promotion to a company; and instead of finding four barriers in his way to command a regiment, at his promotion successively to a lieutenancy, company, majority, and lieutenant-colonelcy, the non-purchasing officer, once appointed, would only have one purchase promotion before him. It was very generally believed that this suggestion, in a modified form, would be adopted by the Government; but whatever intentions may have been in Sir John Pakington's mind when he came down to the House, the tone of the debate and the evident unwillingness evinced to authorise expenditure enabled him to go with the ruck, and save his pocket at the expense of his conscience. On the whole, we are not altogether sorry that this scheme died a natural death; for though it had merits of no mean order, it could only have been # temporary reform. If once the abolition of purchase above the rank of captain had condemned the system, purchase must before long have gone altogether, and then an entirely fresh arrangement would have been required. As it is, the system can be dealt with as a whole, and its entire removal with one and the same stroke will probably be far the most satisfactory course. For the more closely we examine the matter, the more distinctly do we see that the purchase system must be cut out root and branch, for that its existence interferes materially with the well-being of the whole army.
        The charges which are brought against the purchase system are direct and indirect. It is charged with being in itself necessarily evil, inasmuch as the sale of office cannot but be a national sin. It is accused of bearing hardly on the purchasing officers, who sink large sums of money on the risk of their life, obtaining in their pay little or no more than the interest on the money invested, so that they actually give their services to the State for nothing, only receiving back their principal on leaving the army; whereas in any other profession in the world they would have either the interest of their capital as an addition to their income during their service, or the accumulated interest as an addition to their capital on retiring, together with a pension from the State. It is accused of bearing hardly also on the non-purchasing officers, who are passed over simply because they have no money, and for no other reason in the world. These are the direct charges against the system; but, important as they are, they are small in comparison to the indirect charges. It is accused of introducing a spirit of dishonest traffic among our officers, of excluding many able men from high positions, and of promoting men who are not efficient; of closing the higher ranks of the army to those who have merit without money; of effectually preventing promotion from the ranks to any extent, and thus,—and this is, to our mind, the climax of the evil,—keeping up the shameful system of recruiting, which is a foul stain upon our national honour. To this the defendants reply that the army is well officered and well manned, and that there is no necessity for any change of system. On the one hand, we have Mr. Trevelyan, with epigrammatic terseness, describing the army as officered from the froth and manned from the dregs of society; on the other hand, we have Conservative military members appealing to the deeds performed by English soldiers, and the victories achieved by English arms, as proof of the excellence of the system as it exists.
        The whole issue lies in this. Is the army to be a profession or not? Are the officers to enter it with a view to making it the pursuit of their lives, and devoting their entire energies to military service; or are they to enter for a brief space as a pastime, and therefore, as a matter of course, not to look seriously upon their duties? Are the ranks to be filled by men who seek the army voluntarily, with their eyes open, as a good profession,—in which case the highest punishment would be dismissal from the service,—or are we to bait traps with money and drink for the scapegraces of large towns,—for even these will not come voluntarily,—and force them to remain and do their duty in the service by means of a severe penal code? To our mind, the question admits of only one answer. If it were the case that the only duties of a soldier or an officer were to fight the enemy, we might say let matters remain as they are. However low one descends in the social scale, there will always be found there plenty of good pluck and courage. But the duties of war are rare and far between, and the duties of peace are constant, and ever at hand. The army which is best constituted and organised for a time of peace will also behave best in time of war, and during peace it will be a blessing instead of a curse to the nation. As matters stand, we take any man into the ranks without knowledge of his previous career; we angle for men with bounty; we pay recruiting sergeants levy money, and crimps "bringing" money to get us men, concerning whom we make no inquiry, except as to their physical fitness to be food for powder. In these days we do make some effort to humanise them when once they are caught; but, assuming that they will be, or, at all events, that a large number will be bad characters, we fence them in with restrictions, and create a code of laws which are purely artificial, but whose infraction is severely punished. It is assumed that they must be kept in order with the strong hand, and the strong hand is held over them. Brought into the army by the promise of a life of freedom, what wonder that they desert in thousands? And then they are advertised in the "Hue and Cry," and a price is put upon them. Captured, they are brought in handcuffs to the regiment from which they have deserted, tried, imprisoned, and restored to duty, but with a bad name. The screw is put on harder than ever, and there is a second desertion, and another recapture; and so on, till the end comes in an ignominious dismissal, coupled with the marking of the breast with the letters of shame, and yet hailed with delight by the unwilling soldier. These bad bargains cost the State no small sum. The heavy votes for military law, prisons, and police,—the large sums of bounty money, levy money, bringing money,—the huge expenditure on hospital and medical attendance caused by misconduct,—the loss of service during desertion and imprisonment,—might all be either removed or greatly diminished by the recognition of the simple fact that the army should be made so desirable a profession as to render dismissal the highest possible punishment. When this is acknowledged, and the army is sought after eagerly by the youth of the country, a test of character may be applied before admission, and the bad men, who are the cause of the penal system now in vogue, kept out of the ranks. But how is this to be accomplished? The mere raising of pay will never suffice. It might draw a sufficient number of good private soldiers; but if we are to have good non-commissioned officers, on whom so much of our discipline depends, a better class of men must be induced to join. The complaint is universal throughout the army at the present time that it is most difficult to find good men to promote. How are such men to be brought into the army as we require for this purpose?
        Before answering this question, we must touch on one other point,—the question of length of service. It is very generally admitted that the service would be far more popular if enlistments were for a shorter period; and probably most officers will admit that they would rather command young soldiers of less than ten years' service than old soldiers of more than twelve years. But if it is to become a matter of course that after a short period of service there must follow removal from the army, it ceases to be a profession, and few men would be so unwise as to sacrifice the best years of their youth to a career which holds out no promise for the future. In an article which we published in February last, we discussed the relative merits of young soldiers and old soldiers, and quoted the very pertinent remarks of General Trochu on this subject. Since that time an interesting pamphlet on Army Organisation has been published by Major Leahy, of the Royal Engineers, in which he clearly shows the great expense thrown upon the country by the re-engagement of old soldiers; and puts very plainly before his readers that we might have 80,000 young soldiers in the ranks, and 30,000 old soldiers in an army of reserve, for the same cost as is entailed by the 30,000 old soldiers in the ranks. The advantages to a nation of keeping men only a comparatively short time in the ranks, and then passing them to a reserve, supplying their places with fresh troops, are so obvious, that there is small doubt but we shall before long see this system introduced. Under such a system there would never be any lack of privates; but how about the non-commissioned officers? Would really good men enlist if, at the end of seven years or so, they must leave the service? The ordinary working man would reap decided advantage from a seven years' service, with its opportunities of education and travel, and the subsequent pension or retaining fee for service in the reserve; but this would not meet the case of the better educated classes who aspire to something higher. To them the army must be made a profession, and it can only be made so by opening the higher posts to merit, even though it be shown in the ranks, which are now looked on as the one place from which a commission is never to be obtained.
        On this point we are undoubtedly at issue with the majority of officers in the British army, who would have no promotion from the ranks; and, strange to say, we are at issue with the majority of non-commissioned officers as well, for, with their experience of matters as now constituted, they have no wish to be promoted. They have learned to look upon promotion to a commission, unless it be to a non-combatant post, a quartermastership or a paymastership, or something of that sort, as a positive misfortune. And why? Because, in the first: place, they find themselves. nearly ruined. They are launched into a position where the ordinary expenditure is twice or three times the income, and where their poverty prevents them from taking their share in the customary expenses of the officers. For this they are looked down upon, and they find themselves without society. No longer able to associate with the non-commissioned officers who were so lately their friends, tabooed by the officers among whom their lot is now cast, they are isolated and unhappy. Their habits, too, unfit them to a certain extent for the society of the officers, for the class from which they spring is other than that to which they are raised. Hence, in most cases, married men are chosen for promotion; because, being married, they will not live at the mess and become wet blankets to their brother-officers of superior breeding. Thus, as matters now stand, it is, as a rule, an injury to a non-commissioned officer to give him a commission; and his promotion is a nuisance to his brother-officers, who complain that he interrupts the harmony of their society, and, if he is married, that his wife is neither by education nor habits a fit associate for the ladies of the regiment. That is the present state of affairs.
        But suppose it were said that from a given date one-third of the commissions in the army would be given to non-commissioned officers of not more than seven years' service, and who would, as a matter of course, be unmarried. At once an immense alteration would take place. Instead of the utter hopelessness of any advancement deterring men of good education and position from enlisting, the prizes held out would be well worth acceptance. A short service in the ranks would be no hardship in comparison with the opportunities afforded of making a career, especially when the man of decent position would no longer be such a rarity in the ranks as now. Officers say that men of any refinement or education would never enlist, because of the discomforts of a soldier's life,—that men of respectable position would never consent to be herded up in a barrack-room, night and day, with men of the low class from which the majority of soldiers are taken, or to submit to the daily sights and sounds which would offend their eyes and ears. If this be true, it is a strong argument for some slight alteration in barracks, and that is all. Besides, if inducements sufficient were held out, there would not be only one such man in a regiment or a company, but many, and they might live together. There is no valid reason why men should not be allowed to choose their own companions for the barrack-room. A gentleman can keep his refinement through many rough times and much enforced submission to coarse usages. African travellers have not forgotten all their manners when they come home, though they may have been subject to strangely unpleasant customs. Only hold out sufficient inducements in the way of future prospects, not too remote, and the man of energy and courage will cheerfully submit to a present inconvenience. By these means young men of good position and education, without the means to pay for the expensive education of a military college, might easily be induced to enlist as the stepping-stone to a commission. Youth, education, intelligence, activity, zeal, would be their characteristics. What splendid material for non-commissioned officers, and, duly trained, what first-rate material for officers, is here! An educational test, before promotion to a commission, would be necessary; the real test would be the opinion of the officers of the regiment, who would form the recommending council. Sprinkle through the ranks a few such men as this in each regiment, and how soon the. whole tone of the service will improve. How soon the parents, who now look upon enlistment as degradation and disgrace to their son, will learn to look upon it as the opening to an honourable career, and to the companionship of a superior class, instead of an enforced association with reprobates. Once begin to raise the tone, and the character test may soon be applied. Even as it is, the black sheep are the exception in the service; under the system proposed, there would be absolutely no place for them in the ranks. But whenever this opening is made, whenever the commissioned ranks of the army are opened to merit in the non-commissioned ranks, at the same time two existing abuses must be abolished,—public-house recruiting, with its train of levy money and bringing money, and the purchase of either first appointments or promotion. The recruiting system must be changed, to prevent the possibility of depraved characters troubling the service with their presence; the purchase must be abolished, to give the poor men who rise from the ranks an equal chance with those who obtain their appointments by other means.
        But then, say the advocates of purchase, if you abolish this system of promotion by a combination of seniority and cash, what can you substitute for it? If you fall back on pure seniority, the result will be simple stagnation, as we have seen on former occasions, and as we shall very soon see again in the non-purchase corps,—the Artillery, Engineers, and Marines. If you fall back on selection, you will open the door to the very grossest jobbery, and interest will overrule seniority and merit together. Your proposed remedies, they say, are worse than the disease. To this we have a ready answer. The rate at which promotion shall go on lies entirely at the discretion of the State. To make the promotion as rapid as desirable is a mere question of providing proper retiring allowances; in other words, it is a mere question of money. The seniority corps have fallen into a wretched state of stagnation, only because there is a complete want of any proper system of retirement. In the words of the report drawn up by the Select Committee of last year, the present "combination of contrivances is unsatisfactory, complicated, uncertain in its operations, based upon no clear principle, and inadequate for its purpose;" and the principles which should govern a proper system of retirement are laid down by the committee as a limit of age for compulsory retirement from active duties, a graduated rate of retired pay, which every officer should be entitled to claim after a given number of years' service, and facilities for compounding the retired pay of officers for a sum of money down. Perhaps there never was a committee that went more carefully into its work than this. Including men of every shade of political opinion, men in office and men out of office, men famous as army reformers, such as Major O'Reilly, Mr. Otway, and Mr. Trevelyan, and men notable as rigid Conservatives, as Colonel Percy Herbert and Colonel North,—including the Secretary of State for War of the Liberal Government, the Marquis of Hartington, and having Mr. Childers, the Financial Secretary of the Liberal Government, as its chairman, its recommendations were not likely to err on the side of undue expenditure of public money. Yet Sir John Pakington has overruled the scheme which, after mature deliberation and consultation with the Controller and Actuary of the National Debt Office, that committee brought forward; and a scheme of his own, concocted in a hole and corner of the War Office, is to be introduced, instead of this, which had given universal satisfaction to the regiments concerned, and to the country, so far as may be gathered from the fact that the press was unanimous in its favour. Thus this vitally important question has already been shelved for a year, and is still unsettled. Had the committee's plan been adopted, it would now have been in full operation, its working would have been seen, and an opportunity would have been afforded of judging what retirement scheme would answer, when the State takes up its proper duties of providing pensions for the officers of the line who have grown grey in its service. There is every reason to believe that such a scheme, modified to meet the requirements of the line, would answer every purpose in making promotion sufficiently rapid.
        Then, as regards selection, although instances of interest overriding all other claims would probably occur, they would be shown up at the bar of public opinion, and a course of unfair dealing could never be persevered in. Look, for instance, at the commands or full colonelcies of regiments. There was a time when they were grossly jobbed; now the selections give universal satisfaction. With the press actively on the look out to detect and expose undue favouritism, it would scarcely be possible to make bad selections, either by choosing unfit men or passing over those who are fit. Besides, there is nothing new in the principle of selection for commands of regiments; only it has been hampered and crushed by the purchase system. A single instance given by Sir Duncan Macdougall, in his evidence before the Royal Commission on Purchase of 1857, will suffice to show this. Major Ferguson, of the 85th, who was "one of the most magnificent fellows in the army, and through everything during the Peninsular war," was purchased over for the lieutenant-colonelcy by an officer brought from another regiment. The Duke of Wellington felt that it was very hard upon him; and a disagreeable affair occurring not long afterwards in another regiment, and it being necessary to give the command to some energetic and determined man, the Duke selected Major Ferguson from the whole of the Peninsular army for the command.
        The rest of the story had better be told in Sir Duncan Macdougall's own words. "A very singular thing was this, and it shows how much depends upon chance in purchase. If I had come off picquet at Bayonne five minutes later than I did one day, Major Ferguson never would have had the command of the regiment, and Sir George Brown probably never would have been adjutant-general at the Horse Guards, nor second in command in the Crimea; and the circumstances were these:—I was marching from picquet at Bayonne. I passed the tent of Major Ferguson, and he said, 'I want to speak to you.' I halted the picquet. 'Here,' said he, 'is a letter I have received from Lord Fitzroy Somerset.' It was offering him the command of the regiment by purchase. I said, 'I am very glad to hear it;' and he said, 'But I cannot purchase, and I have written a letter to refuse.' I took the letter and tore it up, and I said, 'Write immediately, and say that you will purchase.' He said, 'I cannot: I have only so much.' 'Well,' I said, 'that is quite enough. Brown is the senior captain, and he shall give so much; Lieutenant Wilkinson shall give so much, and so on; I know that Gubbins will give £200 to become senior captain.' I was the fourth captain, and I said, 'I will give £100.' He wrote the letter, and got the lieutenant-colonelcy. Captain Brown was then away, and when he came up he found that we had arranged all about the purchase. But Lord Wellington would have been obliged to look out for another officer in consequence of Major Ferguson not being able to purchase; my coming off picquct five minutes later would have prevented it, but in consequence of this it was all arranged." Thus, if his brother-officers had not made up a purse to enable Major Ferguson to purchase, the Duke of Wellington's selection would have gone for nothing, the — regiment would not have had the efficient commanding officer they required, and the public would have been losers. It is worth the notice of our non-military readers that the increase of pay from a majority to a lieutenant-colonelcy, a step the regulation price of which is £1,300, is one shilling a day, or less than one and a half per cent. interest on the capital sunk.
        This is a specimen of selection hampered by purchase. Now who are the men that object so much to a system of selection? As Mr. Trevelyan pointed out, the very ones who are always so angry with civilians presuming to say anything against the Horse Guards. But in truth the system of selection would be more a name than a reality. Seniority would be the rule by which men would be advanced to commands, except where there was either notorious unfitness on the part of the senior, or striking and exemplary claims on the part of a comparatively junior officer. In the Artillery, for example, where regimental promotion goes strictly and purely by seniority, the higher commands, such as districts and brigades, are given by selection ;and we do not hear of perpetual jealousies and heartburnings being in existence. We are inclined to think that too much stress has been laid on the principle of selection, the application of which would really be very limited; while the jobbery which would arise from it has been unduly magnified into a gigantic bugbear.
        Intimately connected with the purchase system, interwoven, indeed, with every part of our military scheme, is the question of education. One-third of the commissions being given to non-commissioned officers, Sir Charles Trevelyan proposes to obtain two-thirds of the remaining officers by a combination of nomination and competition, followed by a course of training at a military college. He proposes that the commander-in-chief should keep a list, as now, on which the names of those candidates of whose antecedents he is satisfied should be inscribed, and that these should then be subjected to an examination, not in special subjects, but in their general education, so as to obtain the best material for the service which a liberal general education can bestow; and that the selected candidates should go through a course of professional training at a military college, which would instruct them in military science and a soldier's duties, at the same time testing their moral fitness for a commission. No better course could be adopted, provided the age of entrance be not brought too low, provided the examination be such as really to test the whole work of the candidate's school-career, and to defeat the abominable system of cramming which is ruining half the energy and intellect of the country, and provided a better tone be introduced than now exists at Sandhurst.
        The question of age is of vital importance. It is the taking a boy away from school, before he has obtained any liberal education, that is so fatal to all honest, independent thought. Before his mind is formed, his energies are all forced into one groove, and he is trained to view things only in one light. Sent to Sandhurst at sixteen, a boy learns to adopt the traditions of the college and of the regiment into which he afterwards is turned as his gospel and his creed. They must be right. It is treason to think otherwise. Take the purchase system for an instance. Lord Clyde said before the Commission of 1857, "I have not thought out the question. I found the system of purchase established when I entered as a boy of fifteen; I am now in my 63rd year. I was present at the battles of Vimiera and Corunna, and on the expedition to Walcheren, and came home again before I was sixteen, and finding that, and living always with troops under the system that has gone on, I had ceased to think of it until now, and I have not thought it out." But when he did think it out, he strongly condemned the system. Perhaps no better illustration of this bigotry, on the part of military men, to the creed in which they are brought up can be found than in the fact that one officer gave evidence before the Commission that he had been purchased over eighteen times, and had been eighteen years getting his company, but was now, nevertheless, strongly in favour of the system. Few men have thought over the question of professional education more carefully than Lord Macaulay; few men approached the question with a more powerful intellect ;and he writes, in speaking of education for the Civil Service of India, "Men who have been engaged, up to one or two and twenty, in studies which have no immediate connection with the business of any profession, and of which the effect is merely to open, to invigorate, and to enrich the mind, will generally be found, in the business of every profession, superior to men who have, at eighteen or nineteen, devoted themselves to the special studies of their calling." But the majority of officers of high standing, or of more than ten years' service in the army, will be found crying out against giving commissions at a later age than seventeen or eighteen. They say that discipline cannot be taught, that the officers are not pliant enough, after that age. Depend upon it, if the system of discipline is good, it will commend itself more thoroughly to them when they are old enough to appreciate its value, than when they are mere boys, and look upon all discipline as a bore. But most fortunately, just as the tide of prejudice was sweeping backwards, and the age of entrance to the millitary colleges was to be reduced, Lord Eustace Cecil stepped forward and obtained the consent of Government to the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate and report upon the whole system of military education. He has done good service to the country and the army, and deserves the thanks of all sincere army-reformers.
        We are a strange people in our dealings with military matters. We spend more money per man on our troops than any other army in the world, nearly twice as much, or more than twice as much, as some; yet we have to tout in public-houses for recruits, and we have an almost universal discontent on all sides. Much is due to our wretched double military government, with two conflicting interests perpetually hauling against each other,—much to the weakness and truckling to popularity or private interests of successive Secretaries of State for War. It is a hard task for those who have the interest of the army at heart, and who are willing to work with all their might for its improvement. They may seem to fail, as Mr. Trevelyan seems to have failed, for a time; but truth and honesty will win in the end; and if failures seem to be often repeated, we would ask them to learn from that noble-hearted prelate, Archbishop Whately, how never to fail. "Some consider me," he wrote, "as very sanguine, because I always attempt whatever has even a slight prospect of success, and am never disheartened by failure. But the fact is, I never do fail; for my orders are, not to conquer, but only to fight; and whenever I do happen to conquer also, that is so much over and above."